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   Transnational	  Crime1	  can	  loosely	  be	  defined	  as	  a	  crime	  that	  occurs	  across	  
borders	   and	   is	   differentiated	   from	   domestic	   and	   international	   crime	   by	   the	  
absence	   of	   a	   single	   sovereign	   or	   supranational	   power	   that	   has	   absolute	  
jurisdiction	  over	  the	  crime.	  	  The	  dynamics	  of	  actors	  in	  transnational	  spaces,	  as	  
well	  as	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  clear	  enforcing	  authority	  in	  such	  spaces,	  creates	  significant	  
challenges	   to	   efforts	   to	   disrupt	   and	   deter	   transnational	   crime.	   	   Addressing	  
these	   types	   of	   crimes	   requires	   a	   holistic	   approach	   from	   state	   and	   non-­‐state	  
actors	   using	   a	   variety	   of	   tools,	   many	   of	   which	   are	   not	   traditionally	   law	  
enforcement	   in	   nature.	   	   Focusing	   on	   the	   financial	   aspects	   of	   transnational	  
crime,	   this	   paper	   seeks	   to	   outline	   some	   of	   the	   current	   tools	   available	   for	  
addressing	   transnational	   crime,	   as	   well	   as	   advocating	   for	   an	   integrated	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  reflect	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  of	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  or	  the	  U.S.	  Government	  
1	  See	  G.A.	  Res	  55/25,	  ¶	  6,	  U.N.	  Doc.	  A/RES/55/25	  (Nov.	  15,	  2000).	  The	  U.N.	  Convention	  against	  
Transnational	  Organized	  Crime,	  signed	  December	  2000,	  characterizes	  an	  offence	  as	  
transnational	  in	  nature	  if:	  
a) It	  is	  committed	  in	  more	  than	  one	  State;	  	  
b) It	  is	  committed	  in	  one	  State	  but	  a	  substantial	  part	  of	  its	  preparation,	  planning,	  direction	  
or	  control	  takes	  place	  in	  another	  State;	  	  
c) It	  is	  committed	  in	  one	  State	  but	  involves	  an	  organized	  criminal	  group	  that	  engages	  in	  
criminal	  activities	  in	  more	  than	  one	  State;	  or	  	  
d) It	  is	  committed	  in	  one	  State	  but	  has	  substantial	  effects	  in	  another	  state.	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I. TRANSNATIONAL	  SPACES	  AND	  SOVEREIGNTY	  
	   In	   the	   academic	   community	   there	   has	   been	   considerable	   debate	   as	   to	  
whether	  the	  international	  system	  of	  nation-­‐states	  has	  collapsed	  in	  the	  face	  of	  
globalism	  and	  retreated	  to	  a	  transnational	  structure	  where	  nation-­‐states	   face	  
declining	   influence.2	   	   The	   rise	   of	   transnationalism	   is	   not	   necessarily	  mutually	  
exclusive	  with	  the	  international	  system.	  	  Rather,	  the	  international	  system⎯and	  
the	   exclusive	   interactions	   between	   nation-­‐states⎯may	  have	   been	   subsumed	  
into	  a	  larger	  transnational	  construct	  that	  incorporates	  the	  activities	  of	  nation-­‐
states	  and	  those	  of	  non-­‐state	  actors	  on	  a	  relatively	  even	  plane	  of	  influence.	  	  	  
	   When	   speaking	   of	   the	   differences	   of	   internationalism	   and	  
transnationalism,	   it	   often	   devolves	   into	   perspectives	   on	   sovereignty.	   	   In	   the	  
traditional,	  modern,	   international	   system	  of	  nations,	   sovereignty	  often	   refers	  
to	   the	   state’s	   exclusive	   control	   over	   the	   territory	   bounded	   by	   its	   borders.3	  	  
Sovereignty	  enables	  the	  state	  to	  dictate	  the	  norms	  of	  the	  society	  inhabiting	  the	  
state’s	   borders.4	   	   Under	   the	   transnational	   system,	   the	   concept	   of	   territory	  
                                                
2	  See	  John	  Agnew,	  The	  Territorial	  Trap:	  The	  Geographical	  Assumptions	  of	  International	  
Relations	  Theory,	  1	  REVIEW	  OF	  INT’L	  POLITICAL	  ECON.,	  no.	  1,	  1994,	  at.	  53-­‐80;	  David	  O.	  Friedrichs,	  
Transnational	  Crime	  and	  Global	  Criminology:	  Definitional,	  Typological,	  and	  Contextual	  
Conundrums,	  34	  SOCIAL	  JUSTICE,	  no.	  2,	  2007,	  at	  4-­‐18;	  Willem	  van	  Schendel,	  Spaces	  of	  
Engagement:	  How	  borderlands,	  illicit	  flows,	  and	  territorial	  states	  interlock,	  in	  ILLICIT	  FLOWS	  AND	  
CRIMINAL	  THINGS:	  STATES,	  BORDERS	  AND	  THE	  OTHER	  SIDE	  OF	  GLOBALIZATION,	  38-­‐68,	  (Ind.	  Univ.	  Press,	  
2005);	  Peter	  Shields,	  Borders	  as	  information	  flows	  and	  transnational	  networks,	  Global	  Media	  
and	  Communication,	  SAGE	  JOURNALS,	  (Jan.	  22,	  2014),	  http://gmc.sagepub.com/content/10/1/3.	  
See,	  e.g.,	  SASKIA	  SASSEN,	  LOSING	  CONTROL?:	  SOVEREIGNTY	  IN	  AN	  AGE	  OF	  GLOBALIZATION	  (Columbia	  
University	  Press,	  1996).	  
3	  Friedrichs,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  4-­‐18.	  	  
4	  Agnew,	  supra	  note	  2,	  at	  53-­‐80.	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becomes	   blurred	   and	   therefore	   understandings	   of	   sovereignty	   become	  
increasingly	  complex.	  
	   Enabled	   by	   economic	   globalization	   and	   integrated	   global	  
telecommunication	   networks,	   social	   structures	   have	   been	   allowed	   to	   form	  
outside	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  traditional	  state	  model.5	  	  Virtual	  cyber	  networks	  and	  
the	   international	   financial	   system	   have	   become	   transnational	   spaces,	   which	  
must	   ensure	   the	   rights	   and	   privileges	   of	   participants	   outside	   the	   scope	   of	  
sovereign	  powers,	  while	  still	  bound	  by	   the	  processes	  and	   infrastructures	   that	  
are	   national	   in	   nature.6	   	   Norm-­‐setting,	   typically	   a	   sovereign	   responsibility,	  
becomes	   a	   balancing	   act	   between	   state	   and	   non-­‐state	   participants	   in	   a	  
transnational	  space.	   	  Both	  have	  tremendous	  influence	  over	  the	  other,	  though	  
neither	   can	   absolutely	   dictate	   to	   the	   other.	   	   Given	   this	   dynamic,	   efforts	   to	  
address	   crime	   in	   transnational	   spaces	  must	   also	   be	   a	   balancing	   act	   between	  
state	  and	  non-­‐state	  action.	  
II. NATURE	  OF	  TRANSNATIONAL	  OFFENSES	  
	   Transnational	  crimes,	  like	  the	  trafficking	  offenses	  that	  are	  the	  subject	  of	  
this	   symposium,	  can	  generally	   fall	   into	   two	  categories:	  crimes	  of	  borders	  and	  
crimes	   of	   transnational	   spaces.	   	   Crimes	   of	   borders	   are	   those	   that	   involve	  
activity	   that	   physically	   crosses	   borders.	   	   Trafficking	   offenses	   are	   the	   most	  
common	  examples	  of	  this	  type	  of	  transnational	  crime,	  as	  nearly	  all	   trafficking	  
offenses	  involve	  the	  movement	  of	  something	  tangible	  from	  one	  jurisdiction	  to	  
another.	   	   National	   authorities	   have	   been	   cooperating	   on	   addressing	   these	  
crimes	  for	  decades.	  	  	  
	   Crimes	  of	   transnational	   spaces,	   however,	   are	  more	  difficult	   to	   address.	  	  
Crimes	   of	   transnational	   spaces,	   involving	   virtual	   communities	   or	   ungoverned	  
spaces,7	   may	   involve	   activities	   or	   components	   that	   never	   fall	   under	   the	  
jurisdiction	   of	   any	   nation	   or	   authority.	   	   Cyber-­‐crime,	  money	   laundering,	   and	  
even	   international	   terrorism	   are	   representative	   examples	   of	   this	   type	   of	  
transnational	  crime.	  	  National	  authorities	  have	  stepped	  up	  efforts	  to	  cooperate	  
on	   addressing	   these	   crimes,	   but	   are	   also	   coming	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	  




                                                
5	  Shields,	  supra,	  note	  2.	  
6	  Sassen,	  supra,	  note	  2.	  	  
7	  For	  example,	  places	  where	  a	  government	  cannot	  exercise	  control,	  like	  the	  border	  between	  
Afghanistan	  and	  Pakistan	  or	  the	  region	  between	  Saudi	  Arabia	  and	  Yemen.	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III. THREAT	  FINANCE	  
	   Because	   of	   the	   profit	   motive	   of	   most	   criminal	   networks/conspiracies,	  
financial	   network	   analysis	   has	   long	   been	   an	   important	   element	   in	   the	  
investigation	   of	   organized	   crime	   and	   its	   subsidiary	   activities.8	   	   It	   is	   only	  
relatively	   recently	   that	   these	   same	   techniques	  have	  been	   applied	   to	  broader	  
transnational	   issues,	   including	   terrorist	  networks,	  proliferators	  of	  weapons	  of	  
mass	   destruction,	   international	   drug	   trafficking	   organizations,	   and	  
transnational	   organized	   crime,	   as	   transnational	   criminal	   networks	   are	  
considered	  a	  credible	  threat	  to	  national	  security.	  
Transnational	   criminal	   threats	   and	   illicit	   trafficking	   networks	   continue	   to	  
expand	  dramatically	  in	  size,	  scope,	  and	  influence—posing	  significant	  national	  
security	   challenges	   for	   the	   United	   States	   and	   our	   partner	   countries.	   These	  
threats	  cross	  borders	  and	  continents	  and	  undermine	  the	  stability	  of	  nations,	  
subverting	  government	   institutions	  through	  corruption	  and	  harming	  citizens	  
worldwide.	   Transnational	   criminal	   organizations	   have	   accumulated	  
unprecedented	   wealth	   and	   power	   through	   trafficking	   and	   other	   illicit	  
activities,	   penetrating	   legitimate	   financial	   systems	   and	   destabilizing	  
commercial	   markets.	   They	   extend	   their	   reach	   by	   forming	   alliances	   with	  
government	  officials	  and	  some	  state	  security	  services.9	  	  
	   What	  had	  once	  been	  almost	  exclusively	  the	  province	  of	  law	  enforcement	  
communities	   is	   now	   increasingly	   coming	   under	   the	   purview	   of	   the	   national	  
security	  community	  –	  and	  is	  being	  addressed	  through	  its	  suite	  of	  tools.	  	  From	  a	  
financial	   perspective,	   two	   significant	   developments	   in	   the	   national	   security	  
community	  are	  being	  leveraged	  against	  transnational	  criminal	  organizations.	  	  	  
	   First,	   financial	   sanctions	   under	   the	   authorities	   of	   the	   International	  
Emergency	  Economic	  Powers	  Act	  (IEEPA)	  are	  now	  being	  leveraged	  against	  the	  
problem	  set.10	   	   These	  powerful	   tools	   are	  designed	   “to	  deal	  with	  any	  unusual	  
and	   extraordinary	   threat,	   which	   has	   its	   source	   in	   whole	   or	   substantial	   part	  
outside	  the	  United	  States,	  to	  the	  national	  security,	  foreign	  policy,	  or	  economy	  
                                                
8	  A	  Brief	  History	  of	  the	  FBI,	  FEDERAL	  BUREAU	  OF	  INVESTIGATION,	  last	  visited	  April	  7,	  2014,	  available	  
at,	  http://www.fbi.gov/about-­‐us/history/brief-­‐history.	  Interestingly,	  during	  one	  of	  the	  “golden	  
eras”	  of	  organized	  crime	  under	  Prohibition,	  it	  was	  the	  Department	  of	  the	  Treasury	  that	  had	  
jurisdiction	  over	  those	  offenses	  and	  not	  the	  Department	  of	  Justice.	  	  
9	  National	  Security	  Strategy,	  WHITE	  HOUSE,	  49,	  May	  2010,	  available	  at	  
http://www.whitehouse.gove/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.	  
10	  See	  Unusual	  and	  extraordinary	  threat;	  declaration	  of	  national	  emergency;	  exercise	  of	  
Presidential	  authorities,	  50	  U.S.C.	  §§	  1701	  –	  1707	  (2013);	  Blocking	  the	  Property	  of	  
Transnational	  Criminal	  Organizations,	  Exec.	  Order	  No.	  13581	  (July	  25,	  2011),	  available	  at	  
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-­‐press-­‐office/2011/07/25/executive-­‐order-­‐blocking-­‐property-­‐
transnational-­‐criminal-­‐organizations.	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of	  the	  United	  States.”11	  	  Consider	  some	  of	  the	  other	  sanctions	  programs	  under	  
IEEPA	   authorities12	   and	   judge	   the	   level	   of	   importance	   the	   government	   is	  
placing	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  transnational	  crime.	  
	   Second,	   a	   new	   perspective	   on	   threat	   network	   intelligence	   analysis	   has	  
arisen.	  	  In	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  attacks	  on	  September	  11,	  2001,	  organizations	  across	  
the	   intelligence,	   defense,	   and	   law	   enforcement	   communities	   developed	   or	  
augmented	   their	   existing	   threat	   finance	   intelligence	   units.	   	   Many	   of	   these	  
efforts	   focused	   on	   terrorism	   finance,	   but	   the	   U.S.	   also	   faces	   challenges	   in	  
proliferation,	   narco-­‐trafficking	   and	   illicit	   finance.	   	   Threat	   finance	   intelligence	  
elements	  have	  grown	  as	  agencies	  have	  come	  to	  understand	  that	  the	  common	  
denominator	   of	   these	   threats	   is	  money	   -­‐	   how	   it	  moves	   and	   how	   it	   supports	  
these	  endeavors.	  	  
	   While	   competing	   definitions	   may	   abound,	   “threat	   finance”	   may	   most	  
aptly	  be	  defined	  as	  any	  financial	  activity	  associated	  with	  actors,	  operations,	  or	  
systems	   that	   threaten	   the	   security	   or	   stability	   of	   the	   U.S.	  	   Financial	   activity	  
typically	   refers	   to	   raising,	   storing,	   moving,	   and	   transferring	   money	   or	   other	  
items	  of	   value.	  	   Actors	   threatening	   the	  U.S.	   include	   an	   array	  of	   transnational	  
networks	  that	  have	  a	  direct	  or	  indirect	  impact	  upon	  U.S.	  national	  security	  or	  its	  
infrastructure.	   	   Some	   examples	   include	   terrorist	   groups;	   proliferators	   of	  
weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction;	  hostile,	   corrupt,	  or	  ostracized	   foreign	   regimes;	  
transnational	   criminal	   organizations	   –	   including,	   cyber	   criminals,	   drug	  
traffickers,	   and	   third-­‐party	   money	   launderers.	   	   Less	   interested	   in	   the	   profit	  
motive,	  practitioners	  of	  threat	  finance	  are	  more	  interested	  in	  uncovering	  what	  
can	  be	  learned	  about	  a	  transnational	  threat	  network	  by	  understanding	  how	  it	  
interacts	   with	   the	   transnational	   space	   of	   the	   international	   financial	   sector.	  	  
Threat	   finance	   intelligence	  has	   come	   to	   serve	   as	   the	   foundation	   for	  many	  of	  





                                                
11	  50	  U.S.C.	  §	  1701.	  
12	  See	  Blocking	  Property	  and	  Prohibiting	  Transactions	  With	  Persons	  Who	  Commit,	  Threaten	  To	  
Commit,	  or	  Support	  Terrorism,	  Exec.	  Order	  13224	  (Sep.	  24,	  2001);	  Blocking	  Property	  of	  
Weapons	  of	  Mass	  Destruction	  Proliferators	  and	  Their	  Supporters,	  Exec.	  Order	  13382	  (June	  29,	  
2005),	  available	  at	  http://www.state.gov/t/isn/c22080.htm;	  Blocking	  Property	  of	  the	  
Government	  of	  Iran	  and	  Iranian	  Financial	  Institutions,	  Exec.	  Order	  13599	  (Feb.	  6,	  2012).	  For	  a	  
complete	  list	  of	  the	  sanctions	  programs	  administered	  by	  the	  Office	  of	  Foreign	  Assets	  Control,	  
please	  see	  http://www.treasury.gov/resource-­‐
center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/Programs.aspx.	  	  
2013]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Transnational	  Influences	  on	  Financial	  Crime	  
 
76 76	  
IV. SOVEREIGN	  MECHANISMS	  FOR	  ENFORCING	  FINANCIAL	  ASPECTS	  OF	  CRIMES	  	  
	   The	  Asset	  Forfeiture	  and	  Money	  Laundering	  Section	  of	   the	  Department	  
of	   Justice’s	   Criminal	   Division	   investigates	   and	   prosecutes	   complex,	   multi-­‐
district,	   and	   international	   criminal	   cases	   involving	   financial	   institutions	   and	  
individuals	  who	   violate	   the	  money	   laundering	   statues,	   the	   Bank	   Secrecy	   Act,	  
and	   other	   related	   statues.	   	   The	  Money	   Laundering	   Control	   Act,	   for	   example,	  
makes	   it	   illegal	   to	   conduct	   certain	   financial	   transactions	   with	   proceeds	  
generated	   through	   specified	   unlawful	   activities.13	   	   The	   Currency	   and	   Foreign	  
Transactions	   Reporting	   Act	   requires	   U.S.	   financial	   institutions	   to	   assist	   U.S.	  
government	  agencies	  to	  detect	  and	  prevent	  money	  laundering.14	   	  Specifically,	  
the	   act	   requires	   financial	   institutions	   to	   keep	   records	   of	   cash	   purchases	   of	  
negotiable	   instruments,	   file	   reports	   of	   cash	   transactions	   exceeding	   $10,000	  
(daily	   aggregate	   amount),	   and	   to	   report	   suspicious	   activity	   that	  might	   signify	  
money	  laundering,	  tax	  evasion,	  or	  other	  criminal	  activities.15	  	  	  
	   International	  efforts	  to	  address	  financial	  crimes	  are	  primarily	  directed	  at	  
preventing	  criminals	  from	  making	  use	  of	  the	  proceeds	  of	  their	  crime,	  as	  well	  as	  
combatting	   the	   influence	   of	   transnational	   criminal	   actors	   on	   the	   legal	  
economy.	   	   In	   addition	   to	   the	   anti-­‐money	   laundering	   and	   counter-­‐terrorist	  
financing	  recommendations	  of	  the	  Financial	  Action	  Task	  Force,16	  there	  are	  four	  
UN	   conventions	   that	   primarily	   make	   up	   the	   international	   regime	   on	   illicit	  
financing	  (UNODC).	  	  The	  1988	  Convention	  against	  the	  Illicit	  Traffic	  in	  Narcotics	  
Drugs	  and	  Psychotropic	  Substances	  is	  the	  first	  international	  convention	  to	  have	  
criminalized	  money	   laundering.17	   	  The	  2003	  Convention	  against	  Transnational	  
Organized	   Crime18	   and	   the	   2005	   Convention	   against	   Corruption19	   extend	   the	  
predicate	  offense	   for	  money	   laundering	  beyond	  drug	   trafficking	   to	  all	   serious	  
                                                
13	  See	  Money	  Laundering	  Control	  Act,	  18	  U.S.C.	  §§	  1956-­‐57	  (1986).	  
14	  See	  Currency	  and	  Foreign	  Transactions	  Reporting	  Act,	  31	  U.S.C.	  §§	  5311-­‐5330	  (2012);	  
Financial	  Crimes	  Enforcement	  Network,	  Department	  Of	  The	  Treasury,	  31	  C.F.R.	  ch.X	  
(commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “Bank	  Secrecy	  Act”	  or	  “BSA”)	  
15	  FinCEN’s	  Mandate	  from	  Congress,	  DEP’T	  OF	  TREASURY,	  last	  visited	  Apr.	  7,	  2014,	  
http://www.fincen.gov/statutes_regs/bsa/.	  
16	  The	  Financial	  Action	  Task	  Force	  (FATF)	  Recommendations	  are	  internationally	  endorsed	  global	  
standards	  against	  money	  laundering	  and	  terrorist	  financing	  and	  are	  designed	  to	  increase	  
transparency	  and	  enable	  countries	  to	  successfully	  take	  action	  against	  illicit	  use	  of	  their	  financial	  
system.	  	  Please	  see	  http://www.fatf-­‐gafi.org/topics/fatfrecommendations/.	  
17	  See	  Convention	  against	  the	  Illicit	  Traffic	  in	  Narcotics	  Drugs	  and	  Psychotropic	  Substances,	  U.N.	  
Doc.	  E/CONF.82/14	  (1990).	  
18	  See	  United	  Nations	  Convention	  Against	  Transnational	  Organized	  Crime,	  No.	  39574,	  as	  
adopted	  by	  G.A.	  Res	  55/25,	  U.N.	  Doc.	  A/RES/55/25	  (Nov.	  15,	  2000).	  
19	  See	  U.N.	  Convention	  against	  Corruption,	  as	  adopted	  by	  G.A.	  Res.	  58/4,	  U.N.Doc.	  A/RES/58/4	  
(Oct.	  31,	  2003).	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crimes,	   while	   urging	   states	   to	   create	   comprehensive	   regulatory	   and	  
supervisory	   regimes	   to	   combat	   money	   laundering.	   	   The	   2002	   International	  
Convention	  for	  the	  Suppression	  of	  the	  Financing	  of	  Terrorism	  required	  member	  
states	  to	  protect	  financial	  systems	  from	  abuse	  by	  terrorist	  actors.20	  
	   With	   the	   exception	   of	   the	   authorities	   and	   agreements	   directed	   at	  
countering	   the	   financing	   of	   terrorism,	   almost	   all	   of	   the	   formal	   authorities	  
described	   above	   are	   directed	   at	   disrupting	   the	   beneficial	   use	   of	   proceeds	   of	  
crime.	   	   This	   is	   an	   important	   tactic	   in	   combating	   the	   threat	   posed	   by	  
transnational	   criminal	   organizations,	   but	   it	   only	   addresses	   one	   aspect	   of	   the	  
underlying	   financial	  network	   that	  may	  underpin	   the	  criminal	  organization.	   	   In	  
combining	  threat	  finance	  intelligence	  with	  the	  financial	  sanctions	  under	  IEEPA,	  
as	  discussed	  above,	  the	  U.S.	  Government	  has	  another	  powerful	  tool	  for	  directly	  
targeting	  the	  criminal	  network	  itself.	  
V. FINANCIAL	  INSTITUTIONS	  AND	  THE	  EXCHANGE	  OF	  INFLUENCE	  
	   Clearly,	  the	  role	  of	  law	  enforcement	  authorities	  are	  critically	  important	  in	  
the	   enforcement	   of	  money	   laundering	   and	   transnational	   financial	   crime,	   but	  
the	   tools	   of	   the	   national	   security	   community	   are	   important	   to	   worldwide	  
efforts	   to	   combat	   these	   crimes.	   	   This	  doesn’t	   imply	  military	  action	   should	  be	  
used	   to	   address	   this	   issue,	   but	   that	   in	   transnational	   spaces,	   the	   information-­‐
sharing	   and	   outreach	   conducted	   by	   the	   national	   security	   community	   can	   be	  
extremely	  effective.	  
	   We’ve	   already	   discussed	   the	   international	   financial	   system	   as	   being	   a	  
transnational	   space.	   	   Within	   that	   system,	   large	   international	   financial	  
institutions	  are	  influential	  actors	  that	  can	  and	  often	  do	  have	  significant	  impact	  
on	   the	   financial	   system.	   	   Large	   international	   financial	   institutions	   are	   both	  
participants	   in	   a	   transnational	   space	   and	   transnational	   networks	   themselves.	  	  
They	  have	  branch	  offices	  and	  subsidiaries	  all	  over	  the	  world;	  share	  information,	  
expertise,	  and	  resources	  throughout	  the	  institution;	  and	  must	  comply	  with	  the	  
regulatory	  regimes	  in	  every	  jurisdiction	  in	  which	  they	  operate.	   	  Even	  with	  the	  
efforts	  of	  organizations	  like	  the	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  the	  Treasury,	  the	  Financial	  
Action	  Task	  Force,	  and	  the	  United	  Nations	  to	  establish	  minimum	  standards	  for	  
the	  regulation	  and	  oversight	  of	   financial	   institutions	  on	   illicit	   finance,	   there	   is	  
still	   quite	   a	   bit	   of	   differentiation	   between	   jurisdictions.	   	   While	   many	  
jurisdictions	  adhere	  to	  the	  minimum	  standards,	  they	  are	  still	  free	  to	  add	  other	  
measures	   on	   top	   of	   those	   standards,	   which	   add	   complexity	   to	   a	   financial	  
institution’s	   compliance	   function.	   	  With	  penalties	   for	  non-­‐compliance	  passing	  
                                                
20	  See	  International	  Convention	  for	  the	  Suppression	  of	  the	  Financing	  of	  Terrorism,	  No.	  38349,	  
as	  adopted	  by	  G.A.	  Res	  54/109,	  U.N.	  Doc	  A/RES/54/109	  (Dec.	  9,	  1999).	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the	  billion	  dollar	  mark,	  the	  consequences	  for	  financial	  institutions	  continue	  to	  
escalate.	  21	  
	   One	   response	   of	   the	   financial	   industry	   has	   been	   to	   come	   together	  
independently	   and	   respond	   to	   local	   and	   international	   efforts	   to	   establish	  
standards	   for	   financial	  crime	  compliance.	   	  One	  such	  organization	   is	  known	  as	  
the	  Wolfsberg	  Group.	  	  The	  Wolfsberg	  Group	  is	  an	  association	  of	  eleven	  global	  
banks,	  which	  aims	  to	  develop	  financial	  services	  industry	  standards,	  and	  related	  
products,	   for	   Know	   Your	   Customer,	   Anti-­‐Money	   Laundering	   and	   Counter	  
Terrorist	  Financing	  Policies.	   	  The	  Wolfsberg	  Anti-­‐Money	  Laundering	  Principles	  
for	  Private	  Banking	  were	  published	  in	  October	  2000,	  and	  most	  recently	  revised	  
in	  June	  of	  2012.22	  	  
	   While	   financial	   institutions	  have	   always	  been	   responsible	   for	   their	   own	  
decisions	   regarding	   risk,	   those	   decisions	   are	   influenced	   by	   the	   regulatory	  
environment.	   	   Given	   the	   increasingly	   high	   penalties	   for	   non-­‐compliance	   and	  
the	   fast-­‐moving	   pace	   of	   change	   in	   world-­‐wide	   financial	   crime	   regulations,	  
individual	   international	   financial	   institutions,	   in	   some	   situations,	   have	   gotten	  
out	   in	   front	   of	   their	   regulators.	   	   For	   example,	   in	   November	   2013,	   HSBC	  
implemented	  a	  policy	  to	  ask	  customers	  to	  show	  evidence	  of	  what	  they	  planned	  
to	   do	   with	   some	   large	   cash	   withdrawals.23	   	   Enhanced	   due	   diligence	   is	   an	  
appropriate	   response	   to	   potentially	   risky	   circumstances,	   and	   is	   commonly	  
found	   in	   guidance	   from	   regulators.	   	   In	   this	   situation,	   however,	   the	  
determination	  to	  request	  this	  information	  from	  customers	  was	  wholly	  internal,	  
perhaps	   influenced	   by	   HSBC’s	   past	   penalty,	   but	   certainly	   not	   dictated	   by	   its	  
regulator.	   	  This	   type	  of	  self-­‐policing	  may	  be	  happening	  more.	   	   In	   response	  to	  
recent	  sanctions	  against	  certain	  Russian	  officials,	  JP	  Morgan	  made	  the	  news	  for	  
blocking	  a	   transaction	  between	  a	  Russian	  embassy	  and	  an	   insurer,	  effectively	  
“self-­‐sanctioning.”24	   	   In	   an	   industry	   with	   a	   reputation	   for	   pushing	   the	  
boundaries	   of	   the	   letter	   of	   the	   law,	   this	   perceived	   shift	   towards	   stricter	  
tolerances	   for	   financial	   crime	   risk	   have	   significant	   implications	   for	   the	  
transnational	  enforcement	  of	  transnational	  crime.	  
	   Forums	   created	  by	   the	  Wolfsberg	  Group,	   as	  well	   as	  by	   forward	   leaning	  
financial	   institutions,	   create	   opportunities	   by	   governments	   to	   influence	   and	  
                                                
21	  Chad	  Bray,	  HSBC	  Apologizes	  After	  Cash	  Withdrawal	  Issue	  in	  Britain,	  N.Y.	  TIMES,	  Jan.	  26,	  2014,	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23	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inform	  key	  actors	   in	  the	   international	   financial	  system.	   	  Governments	  already	  
influence,	  successfully	  it	  appears,	  financial	  institutions	  through	  their	  regulatory	  
and	   oversight	   authorities.	   	  Moreover,	   discussions	   between	   governments	   and	  
financial	   institutions	   on	   financial	   crime	   risk	   occur	   on	   a	   regular	   basis.25	   	   But	  
many	   of	   these	   discussions	   occur	   in	   the	   construct	   of	   the	   overseer/overseen	  
relationship,	   which	   can	   have	   a	   chilling	   effect	   on	   more	   robust	   collaboration.	  	  
Financial	   institutions,	   however,	   have	   a	   great	   deal	   of	   legitimacy	   in	   the	  
international	   financial	   system,	  and	  have	  considerable	  ability	   to	  set	   the	  norms	  
of	  that	  system.	   	  Within	  the	  transnational	  space	  of	  the	  financial	  system,	  those	  
qualities	   place	   financial	   institutions	   on	   a	   similar	   plane	   of	   influence	   as	  
governments.	   	   It	   is	   important	   to	   engage	   these	   institutions	   from	   that	  
perspective	   and	   respect	   their	   ability	   to	   act	   outside	   the	   exclusive	   scope	   of	  
sovereign	  authority.	  
VI. IMPLICATIONS	  
	   So	   what	   are	   the	   implications	   for	   the	   practitioner?	   	   In	   short,	   the	   legal	  
environment	   is	   increasingly	  complex.	   	   In	  addition	  to	  the	  array	  of	  national	  and	  
international	  laws,	  regulations,	  and	  other	  authorities	  that	  govern	  transnational	  
criminal	   law	   enforcement,	   one	   must	   consider	   the	   independent	   activities	   of	  
influential	   transnational	   actors.	   	   Legal	   advice	   is	   not	   complete	   unless	   it	  
considers	   the	   norms	   of	   the	   society	   in	  which	   the	   client	   acts.	   	   Typically,	   those	  
norms	   are	   reflected	   in	   the	   laws	   of	   the	   land,	   but	   this	   is	   not	   always	   true	   in	  
transnational	  spaces.	  	  Rather,	  influential	  actors	  in	  transnational	  spaces	  may	  act	  
independently	  or	  set	  norms	  for	  the	  society	  of	  that	  transnational	  space.	  	  This	  is	  
particularly	   true	   in	   the	   financial	   arena,	   as	   the	   risk-­‐based	   decisions	   of	   major	  
international	  banks	  exceed	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  national	  regulations	  under	  which	  
they	  operate.	  	  Failure	  to	  understand	  the	  risk	  appetite	  of	  these	  banks	  may	  result	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